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circumstances were not proven. Additionally, there was nothing in the trial judge's
instruction to indicate that the jury had
the third option advanced by the court of
appeals; namely, to leave the answer blank
when a unanimous finding of either "yes"
or "no" could not be reached and then
proceed to the balancing phase. Therefore,
the Supreme Court concluded that it was
possible that a jury following the trial
judge's instructions could be precluded
from considering possible relevant
mitigating circumstances, "if even a single
juror adhered to the view that such a factor should not be so considered." Id. at
1868.
Regarding the verdict from itself, the
Supreme Court found persuasive the fact
that subsequent to the decision below, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland had found
it necessary to promulgate a new verdict
form, which expressly made provisions for
the jury to find that not all twelve jurors
agree on the existence or nonexistence of a
particular mitigating circumstance. This
new form also expressly makes provisions
for such findings to be included in the balancing portion of the sentencing. The
Court also noted that in the two cases tried
before juries which used the new verdict
form, both juries reported non-unanimous
votes.
Consequently, the Court found
that there is a substantial possibility
that reasonable jurors, upon receiving
the judge's instructions in this case,
and in attempting to complete the verdict form as instructed, well may have
thought they were precluded from
considering any mitigating evidence
unless all twelve jurors agreed on the
existence of a particular such circumstance.
Id. at 1870.
The Court therefore determined that the
death sentence, which was upheld by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, must be
vacated and the case remanded for
resentencing.
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
and Kennedy, concluded that the charges
of the trial judge to the jury were reasonably sufficient to emphasize the need for
unanimity on all the issues involved,
including the existence or nonexistence of
mitigating circumstances. Furthermore,
the dissent noted that the reworking of the
verdict form was not evidence that the
form itself was improper, since "a sentencing instruction that is constitutionally
acceptable may be improved in any
number of ways." Id. at 1874 n.2.
A sentence of death places a heavy burden on the court system to regulate the

procedure by which it may be imposed.
The decision of the Supreme Court in
Mins illustrates not only the careful scrutiny that the imposistion of such sentence
demands, but also the controversial questions that face the courts when protecting
the constitutional rights of a person accused of a capital offense.

-Gregory]. Swain

McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin:
NO-MERIT BRIEF PROVIDED TO
TIlE COURT BY COURT
APPOINTED APPELlATE
COUNSEL DOES NOT VIOLATE
INDIGENT'S SIXTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS
In McCoy v. Court ofAppeals of Wiscon·
sin, _U.S.-o 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988), the
United States Supreme Court held that
Wisconsin's no-merit brief rule, by which
court-appointed counsel must prepare for
the court a statement of why particular
cases, statutes, or facts in the record lead
him to believe his client's appeal is without
merit, is consitutional under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments. In so holding,
the Court indicates that counsel's role as
an officer of the court is at least as important, if not more important, than his role
as an advocate and essentially places the
attorney in the position of decision-maker.
A Wisconsin trial judge found the appellant, an indigent, guilty of abduction and
sexual assault and sentenced him to twelve
years in prison. Appellant then filed an
appeal and the court appointed a lawyer to
represent him. The attorney, after reviewing the case, advised appellant that an
appeal would be useless. Rule 809.32(1) of
the Wisconsin Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
H [a court-appointed attorney] is of the
opinion that further appellate proceedings on behalf of the defendant would
be frivolous and without any arguable
merit within the meaning of A nders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the
attorney shall file with the court of
appeals 3 copies of a brief in which is
stated anything in the record that
might arguably support the appeal and

court with a discussion of why he believed
those arguments were without merit,
claiming such action would contravene
Anders and violate the appellant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. McCay at
1898. Since the brief did not fully comply
with Rule 809.32(1), the court ordered it
stricken and told the attorney to submit a
conforming brief. Instead, counsel sought
a declaratory judgment in the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, asking the court to
declare unconstitutional that portion of
the rule which requires the attorney to discuss why the issue lacks merit. Id. at 1899.
In upholding the rule, the Wisconsin court
and the Supreme Court both relied on and
expanded upon Anders.
The petitioner in Anders was convicted
of the felony of possession of marijuana.
Counsel was appointed to represent him
on appeal; however, after reviewing the
record, the attorney advised his client and
the court that the appeal was without
merit. After petitioner's request for a new
attorney was denied, he proceeded to represent himself on appeal, but his conviction was affirmed. Six years later,
petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in
the Supreme Court of California, asking
the courts to reopen his case because he
had been denied the right to counsel on his
appeal. Both petitions were denied.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held
that California's procedure, by which
court-appointed counsel can withdraw
from an appeal merely by furnishing the
court with a letter in which counsel states
that the appeal lacks merit, "does not comport with fair procedure and lacks that
equality that is required by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Anders at 741. Although
the no-merit letter alerts the court of
potentially frivolous litigation, it gives no
basis for counsel's conclusion and fails to
notify appellant of potential arguments in
support of reversal.
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there's no Way.

a discussion of why the issue lacks merit.
(Emphasis added).
Counsel partially complied with the rule
by submitting arguments in support of the
appeal, stating his belief that the arguments were without merit, and asking for
permission to withdraw from the case.
Counsel failed, however, to provide the
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As a result of the California procedure's
shortcomings, the Court held that before
permission to withdraw will be granted,
counsel must prepare a brief "referring to
anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal." Id. at 744. The procedure the Court adopted was intended to
"assure penniless defendants the same
rights and opportunities on appeal - as
nearly as is practicable - as are enjoyed by
those persons who are in a similar situation but who are able to afford the retention of private counsel." Id. at 745.
Anders was a logical progression from
Gideon 'V. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
and Douglas 'V. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963), wherein the Court expanded the
rights of indigents to effective representation. Gideon provided for the right of an
indigent defendant in a state criminal trial
to have the assistance of counsel. The
Court held that the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of counsel is a fundamental right
made obligatory upon the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon at 342.
Similarly, Douglas provided for the right
of an indigent defendant to counsel in a
criminal appeal as of right. "Where the
merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without
benefit of counsel, ... an unconstitutional
line has been drawn between rich and
poor." Douglas at 357.
A nders recognize counsel's conflicting
responsibilities to his client and to the
court. "His role as advocate requires that
he support his client's appeal to the best of
his ability. Of course, if counsel finds his
case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so
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Justice Brennan interpreted that to mean
that an attorney is expected to argue in
support of his client's appeal but not
against it. "When counsel has nothing further to say in his client's defense, he should
say no more". Id. at 1907. If the attorney
proceeds to argue against his client, which
is what the discussion requirement forces
him to do, he is no longer an advocate, but
is, instead, a friend of the court.
McCoy illustrates a willingness of the
Court to limit the rights of an indigent on
appeal when his attorney expresses the
opinion that the indigent does not have a
viable case. McCoy also attempts to curb
litigation by prohibiting what is, in courtappointed counsel's opinion, frivolous litigation.
This case goes a step further than Anders
by sanctioning no-merit briefs. States that
did not previously have a no-merit brief
rule, believing such was unconstitutional
and in violation of Anders, may not enact
such a rule in an attempt to unclog their
own courts. Finally, McCoy indicates a
possibility that the Court will continue to
limit an indigent's right to counsel on the
theory that counsel is merely fulfilling his
professional and ethical responsibilities by
acting as an officer of the court rather than
solely as an advocate.

-Linda C Eddy

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 137
Wis.2d 90, 100, 403 N.W.2d 449, 454
(1987).
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we held that a court may not permit
appointed counsel to withdraw from a
criminal appeal on the basis of the bald
assertion that there is no merit to the
appeal. Instead, appointed counsel's
role as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of
his ability and that any request to
withdraw on the ground that the
appeal is frivolous must be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in
the record that might arguably support
the appeal. McCoy at 1906.

we view the rule as an attempt to provide the court with notice that there
are facts on record or cases or statutes
on point which would seem to compel
a conclusion of no merit. McCoy 'V.
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advise the court and request permission to
withdraw." Anders at 744. By requiring
the attorney to file a brief outlining possible arguments for reversal at the same time
that he opines that those arguments are
without merit, the attorney satisfies both
his duty to his client and his duty to the
court.
McCoy's arguments on appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court were two-fold. First,
he argued that the rule violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
guarantee by discriminating against indigents. Since only court-appointed counsel
must petition the court for permission to
withdraw from a case, it is only courtappointed counsel who must file the nomerit brief. In contrast, if retained counsel
believes his client's appeal to be without
merit, he simply tells his client that he will
not represent him. A paying client, then,
can continue to search for an attorney
until he finds one who believes the appeal
may succeed.
Appellant'S second argument was that
the rule violated his Sixth Amendment
"right to effective representation by an
advocate." McCoy at 1900. "The constitutional requirement of substantial equality
and fair process can only be attained where
counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to
that of amicus curiae." Anders at 744.
The McCoy Court went a step further
than Anders by requiring counsel to discuss not only arguments which would support reversal but also why he believes
those arguments to be without merit. The
Supreme Court held that by requiring
counsel to thoroughly review the record in
preparation of the brief, "the discussion
requirement provides an additional safeguard against mistaken conclusions by
counsel that the stongest arguments he or
she can find are frivolous." McCoy at 1904.
Although the Supreme Court believed this
requirement would serve the interests of
the' client, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
described the requirement as a judicial aid:

Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in

McCoy presents a cogent argument of why
Wisconsin's discussion requirement would
violate these constitutional guarantees. In
Anders, he said:
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